Thursday, June 18, 2015

The Problem of Evil: A Theodicy, Part One.

The Problem of Evil is perhaps the single most difficult quandary for theologians and philosophers alike. This dilemma is the foremost reason for theological skepticism in the modern era-- and, indeed, of all time, dating back to at least the early Greek civilization in which a thinker by the name of Epicurus lived. The classical Problem of Evil, as given by Epicurus, is stated as follows: 



"Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?"



Aside from what is commonly known as the "emotional" problem of evil, there is a seemingly air-tight"intellectual" problem of evil. As a young Christian theist, I myself am saddened by the obvious rise of atheism within my generation due to this intellectual problem. Many people think that the Problem of Evil simply leads to the conclusion that God does not exist-- or that if He does exist, He doesn't actually exist in the way that Christian theists claim. Those in my generation (or perhaps one before me) read the works of prominent "New Atheists" like Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, and Lawrence Krauss. That's all very well. I encourage people to read the works of prominent atheists. They provide intellectual stimulation and challenge our belief systems, which can be infinitely useful tools in strengthening faith and allowing us to refine and reconstruct our defense systems. However, I discourage people who intend to read only their books. That would promote complete and utter bias, which is something I strive to remove when discussing the intellectual questions about God. Therefore, in addition to the works of atheists, it is of utmost importance to read books written in defense of classical Christian theism. 

Epicurus' version of the dilemma is posed in a question format. When understood that way, it seems rather daunting. After all, if we are to answer Epicurus according to the choices he provides, we are thereby rendered unable to affirm classical theism. That's what makes the problem so difficult to the common man.

However, we may easily dissect Epicurus' questions in an Aristotelian logical syllogism. For those who are unfamiliar with Aristotelian logic, a classical syllogism is comprised of two premises and a conclusion. If both of the premises are true, and the logical form is valid, then it follows necessarily that the conclusion is true. However, if one or more of the premises are false, then the conclusion cannot be affirmed. Let's try to shed some light on the classical Problem of Evil by dissecting Epicurus' quandary. 

The first question Epicurus asks is this : "Is God willing to prevent evil but not able? Then He is not omnipotent." In logical form, the question would translate in this way: 

Premise 1: If God is willing to prevent evil, but is not able, he is not omnipotent.
Premise 2: God is willing to prevent evil, but is not able.
Conclusion: God is not omnipotent. 

If we are to accept both premises as true, then it follows necessarily that God is not omnipotent. This contradicts the classical concept of God, and would disprove theism... if not for an inherent untruth within the first premise. Interestingly enough, Epicurus loaded the dice, so to speak. He did so by sneaking in an a priori concept of omnipotence into the first premise. It can be stated as follows: "God is omnipotent if and only if God is able to prevent evil." This is a blatant lie. God need not be able to prevent evil to be omnipotent. You may ask, "Does not omnipotence mean the ability to do all things?" But I respond, "No. Omnipotence means the ability to do all things that are possible." In order to prove that God is not omnipotent by Epicurus' argument, then, it follows that one must prove that it is possible to prevent evil.

C. S Lewis, in his excellent work on the the problem of evil known as the Problem of Pain, wrote that 
"In a game of chess you can make certain arbitrary concessions to your opponent, which stand to the ordinary rules of the game as miracles stand to the laws of nature. You can deprive yourself of a castle or allow the other man sometimes to take back a move made inadvertently. But if you conceded everything that at any moment happened to suit him-- if all his moves were revocable and if all your pieces disappeared whenever their position on the board was not to his liking-- then you could not have a game at all. So it is with the life of souls in a world: fixed laws, consequences unfolding by causal necessity, the whole natural order, are at once limits within which their common life is confined and also the sole condition under which any such life is possible. Try to exclude the possibility of suffering which the order of nature and the existence of free wills involve, and you find that you have excluded life itself."

From Lewis' argument, we can understand that without free will and the possibility of evil, God could not have created life itself. But surely no-one is foolish enough to suppose that if God exists, He could not have created the world. Therefore, the only viable conclusion about Epicurus' first objection to the concept of God is untrue.







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